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ABSTRACT 
 
Retailers’ pricing strategies are one of the most important determinants of the retail 
dynamics and the competitive structure of the retail market. Retailers use both short-
term and long-term pricing strategies to optimize their market share. This study 
addresses several critical questions: (1) To what extent do retailers react to 
competitive price specials? (2) Do retailers alternate price specials of competing 
brands? and, (3) Can one identify stores or brands, that are price leaders or do 
retailers/brands set prices independently? We use cointegration analysis to estimate 
a model which allows us to study both the short- and the long-run dynamics of 
competitive prices within a single framework.  
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
 
It is well known that the location decision exerts a strong impact on the success or 
failure of a retailer. The location decision vis-a-vis the size and composition of the 
catchment area describes the maximum sales level that can be reached. Once the 
locational decision has been made, retailers have limited control over this decision 
variable. To increase store traffic, they necessarily have to rely on pricing, service and 
product variety. The pricing variable, in particular, constitutes an important tool for 
retailers. 
Price is the dominant competitive tool in many local retail outlets (Coughlan 
and Mantrala 1994; Hamilton and Chernev 2013). The pricing decision is one of the 
most important and difficult decisions that a retailer makes. In the short run and 
long run, retailers need to consider competitive pricing strategies and anticipate 
competitor's reactions. These decisions consist of short-run tactical decisions, e.g., 
temporary price cuts, and longer-run strategic decisions determining price levels. 
While a significant amount of research has examined the short-run dynamics 
of pricing strategies (Blattberg et al., 1995；Empen et al., 2015), long-run retailer 
pricing strategies have received less attention. The current paper is an empirical 
analysis of the short- and the long-run dynamics of competitive retailer pricing 
strategies.  
In the long run, we study equilibrium relationships between prices while in the 
short-run the emphasis is on the competitive dynamics to temporary price change.  
That is, we will identify which brands compete with each other in the long-run and 
the short-run. Long-run pricing strategies are investigated by determining the 
existence of equilibrium relationships between competitive prices. Prices are in long-
run equilibrium if there is no inherent tendency for any of the price series to change 
– while prices may be non-stationary and in short-run disequilibrium there are no 
persistent trends between prices in the long run. In equilibrium, retailers may be 
competing at different price levels. In the short run, we focus on how retailers 
respond to competitive pricing strategies. This study addresses several critical 
questions: (1) To what extent do retailers react to competitive price specials? (2) Do 
retailers alternate price specials of competing brands? and (3) Can one identify stores 
or brands, that are price leaders or do retailers/brands set prices independently? 
We use cointegration analysis, a time-series method, to estimate a model which 
allows us to study both the short- and the long- run dynamics of competitive prices 
within a single framework. The paper is organized as follows. First, we will discuss 
the principles of cointegration analysis. This is followed by a description of the data. 
Next, the results of the analysis will be discussed. We will complete the paper by drawing 
some conclusions. 
 
II.        METHODOLOGY 
 
The empirical approach used in this paper follows the framework by Powers et al. 
(1991). The first step is to test for non-stationarity of the data. If all price series are 
stationary, prices are in long-run equilibrium and simple linear regression can be used 
to analyze the short-run dynamics. When variables are non-stationary, simple 
regression analysis will lead to spurious correlations, biased results, and incorrect 
inferences for t- and F-statistics (Granger and Newbold 1974). It is possible to use 
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first-differencing of the dependent variable, but this filters out the long-run 
relationships between variables. Cointegration analysis models non-stationary data 
while preserving the long-run trends in the data. Therefore, when data are non-
stationary, we first test whether prices are in long-run equilibrium using cointegration 
analysis. When the data are cointegrated, a vector error-correction model (VECM) 
is estimated obtaining estimates for both the short- and the long-run relationships. If 
the data are non-stationary but not cointegrated, first-differencing is used to eliminate 
non-stationarity and a vector auto-regressive model (VAR) is estimated on the first-
differences. This approach provides only the short-run estimates since first- 
differencing eliminates all long-run price trends. Hence, we start by testing for non-
stationarity of sales and prices, followed by cointegration analysis of non-stationary 
prices. 
 
A. Testing for Non-stationarity using the Unit Root Test 
 
We begin by defining stationarity and later we introduce the notion of cointegration 
and error- correction models. The distinction between stationarity and evolution can 
be illustrated through a first-order auto-regressive model of the performance 
indicator in question: 
 
yt a0 ρyt− et                                              (1)  
where, yt is a univariate time series, a0 is the intercept, ρ is the degree of persistence of
yt-1, and et is a random error with expected value 0 and a constant finite variance, et ~IID 
N(0,ϭ2). Subtracting yt-1 from both sides and adding lagged terms for the dependent 
variables we obtain: 
 
∆yt a0 γyt− ∑ βiLi= ∆yt+ et                              (2) 
where, γ =ρ-1, L=number of lagged terms. 
When γ = 0 and a0 is = 0 the time series are non-stationary, while for γ ≠ 0 the
time series is stationary or mean reverting. This is the basis of the unit-root test 
proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) and is called the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
test (ADF).1 
 
B. Cointegration Analysis 
 
Cointegration is a time-series analysis, used to model the long-run relationship between 
variables when these variables are non-stationary (Engle and Granger 1987; Johansen 
and Juselius 1990). It tests whether there exists a steady-state relationship between 
variables that are evolving over time. When variables are non-stationary and in long-run 
equilibrium, the variables are cointegrated. More formally, non-stationary variables are 
cointegrated if there is a linear combination of integrated variables that is stationary. This 
is the definition of an equilibrium relationship used in this study. A major advantage of 
this approach is that it simultaneously measures the short- and the long-run effects  of 
variables in a single framework. It measures the response and competitive interactions 
to short-run marketing inputs, as well as, the long-run equilibrium relationships between 
competing firms. 
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C. The Error-Correction Model 
 
In this paper, we use the Johansen method (Johansen 1988; Johansen and Juselius 1990). 
This is a multivariate extension of the Engle and Granger (1987) model. The vector error-
correction model (VECM) model is derived from the basic vector auto-regressive (VAR) 
model.  
We start with specifying a VAR model in levels, with k lags. 
 
Pt A A Pt− A2Pt− 2 ⋯ AkPt− k ΨXt ut                    (3) 
 
where, Pt, = [P1t, P2t, …, Pnt]’ a vector of prices, all may be endogenous; Ai = (n x n) 
matrix of parameters; Xt = a vector of exogenous variables; and ut ~ IN(0,Σ). 
Next we reparameterize this model using a cointegrating transformation of the 
VAR model. Subtracting and adding Pt-1, Pt-2, and A1 Pt-2 to both sides of equation (3), 
we obtain: 
 
∆Pt A ∑ ΓiΔPt− i ΠPt− k ΨXt utNi=                            (4)  
where,  ΔPt= Pt - Pt-1, is the first difference of prices; Γ = - (I – A1 - …… - Ai), i = 
1,2, ....k-1, and I is a unity matrix; Π = - (I – A1 - …… - Ak); and ut ~ IN(0,ζ). 
Equation (4) is a multivariate generalization of the error-correction model. It 
says, that price changes are a function of lagged changes in own and competitive 
prices (Γi’ s) and the previous period's equilibrium error, captured by the Π matrix 
which establishes the error-correction mechanism. The contemporaneous price 
effects are absorbed by the error term. The relationship between the long-run 
equilibrium and the error-correction term (Π) was shown above for the bivariate case. 
The error-correction matrix Π can be specified as αβ’  where α is the speed of adjustment, 
and β is the long-run parameter, and β’Pt-k, are the error-correction terms (Engle and 
Granger 1987). Intuitively, this implies that when prices are cointegrated this matrix 
consists of a component which governs the long-run equilibrium relationship and a part 
which consists of the short-run deviations from the long-run equilibrium. 
Johansen (1988) specified, when the rank of the Π matrix is positive (rank 0 < r 
<n), then the Π matrix consists of the error-correction mechanisms, such that Π = 
αβ’. Where, β is an (nxr) matrix with the long-run price equilibrium coefficients (or the 
cointegrating vectors), and α is an (nxr) adjustment or feedback matrix. The r columns 
of the β matrix are the cointegrating vectors (β1, β2,... , βr) which contain information on 
the equilibrium relationships that dictate the long-run movement of the price series. 
The feedback matrix measures the speed at which the price series adjust to the 
disturbances in the equilibrium relationship (that is the current period's correction of 
the last period's deviation in order to maintain the long-run equilibrium relationship). 
The larger the alpha's the greater the response to previous period's deviations from the 
long-run equilibrium. When a =1,  price returns to equilibrium within the same time 
period. When a = 0 ,  price does not respond. 
 
D. Estimation and Testing for a Long-Run Equilibrium 
 
Testing for the rank of the Π matrix is a test for cointegration of time-series (Johansen 
1988). Since we have n price time-series, the dimension of the Π matrix is n×n. When 
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the rank of the Π matrix is n, then the vector of prices Pt is stationary (the variables are 
integrated of order zero). A rank of zero indicates that prices are non-stationary but  
not cointegrated. Hence, prices have no long-run link and can wander arbitrarily far 
away from each other. When the rank is 0 < r < n, prices are cointegrated, and the rank 
of the matrix is the number of significant cointegrating vectors. Therefore, the test for 
the existence of a long-run price equilibrium (or cointegration) is: Ho= t he rank of the 
Π matrix = 0 < r < n. 
Johansen (1988) developed a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure, 
based on reduced rank regression, to test for the rank of the Π matrix (the number of 
cointegrating vectors) and to estimate a and β. We use this method in this pape r.  
We refer the reader to Johansen (1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990) or Hendry and 
Doornik (1996, chapter 11) for the details and derivations. 
 
III.       DATA AND ANALYSIS 
 
The data used consists of weekly store-level data on sales and prices of toilet tissue 
and beer for a period of seven years. The data were supplied by Information Resources 
Inc., and was collected by supermarket scanners in a medium-sized test market in the 
USA. Sales are the weekly scanned sales for a particular brand. Price is a weighted 
average of the different varieties and different sizes (e.g. Budweiser and Bud Lite, 
etc.), and is adjusted for the rate of inflation. Basic pooling tests were conducted, which 
indicated that over 95% of sales of different varieties for a brand could be pooled (Bass 
and Wittink 1978). 
We include in our analysis the three major brands of toilet tissue (Soft & 
Gentle, Northern, and Charmin) and the five major brands of beer (Budweiser, Busch, 
Miller, Milwaukee’ s Best, and Old Milwaukee). The three brands of tissue are 
national brands (Charmin is the most expensive brand and Soft & Gentle is the 
cheapest), which have a combined market share of over 80 percent of industry sales. 
The beer data includes four national brands (Budweiser and Miller are premium-
priced beers; Busch and Old Milwaukee have a medium level price; Milwaukee’ s 
Best is a cheaper regional beer), which have a combined share of over 60 percent. 
Private label and Generics sales consist of less than ten percent of industry sales for 
both product classes. 
For the purpose of this study, we selected two different product categories, one 
with stationary industry sales and the other with increasing sales (see Figure 1). The 
tissue market has stationary sales and each brand's market share is stable over time, 
while the beer market is evolving, and several brands have non-stationary market 
shares. This allows us to study for potential differences in the short- and the long-run 
pricing strategies in stationary and non-stationary markets. 
 
A. Results from Analysis 
To study short and long-run price competition, we first perform non-stationarity tests on 
the individual price series. Next, for prices that are non-stationary, we use 
cointegration analysis to test for the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship. 
Following this, we estimate the error-correction model and test for price leadership using 
Granger causality tests. 
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Figure 1  
Total weekly industry sales volume for tissue and beer 
                      Toilet Tissue Sales                                           Beer Sales    
  
B. Test for Non-Stationarity 
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to test for the existence of a unit root. Table l, 
provides the results of these non-stationarity tests for the price series and sales series 
for the beer and tissue categories.2 Results show that sales for all brands of tissue are 
stationary while three brands of beer have non-stationary sales. Furthermore, industry 
sales of tissue are stationary while beer sales are evolving. However, our focus is on 
price competition, hence we focus on the price series. We find that all time-series are 
non-stationary with the exception of Milwaukee’s Best. Given that price series are 
evolving, we next use cointegration analysis to test for long-run equilibrium 
relationships between competitive prices for both beer and tissue. 
 
Table 1 
Results stationarity tests for sales and price series of beer and tissue a 
Beer Sales Price 
Budweiser     2.79/l (6) b 2.69 (8) 
Busch 1.47 (7) 2.69 (6) 
Miller 2.92 (4) 2.02 (6) 
Milwaukee’s Best    3.95** (7)    4.37** (4) 
Old Milwaukee    4.08** (5)  2.04 (12) 
Tissue Sales Price 
Soft & Gentle    3.47** (7) 2.22 (8) 
Northern    5.51** (6) 1.90 (6) 
Charmin    4.92** (6) 1.73 (7) 
a Test statistics for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller. b Number of lags included in parentheses. 
** indicates sales or price series are stationary.
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C. Results of Cointegration Analysis 
Cointegration analyses are conducted to test for the existence of long-run price 
equilibria between competitive prices, to estimate the long and short-run parameters 
of the error-correction mechanism, and to conduct hypotheses tests concerning the 
parameter estimates. The following system of equations is estimated using Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation: 
 
Δ푃푡.
.Δ푃푛푡
Γ
Δ푃푡−.
.Δ푃푛푡−
⋯ Γ푘−
Δ푃푡−푘+.
.Δ푃푛푡−푘+
[
휋 . . 휋푛. . . . . .
휋푛 . . 휋푛푛
]
푃푡−.
.푃푛푡−
 
Ψ
푋푡.
.푋푛푡
+[
푢푡.
.푢푛푡
]                                                     (5) 
 
First, we need to determine the number of lags to include in equation 5. We 
start with a VAR model using undifferenced data, including 8 lagged terms, and 
iteratively delete insignificant lags using the Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC). 
Once the number of lags is determined equation (5) is estimated using the Johansen 
and Juselius (1990) method. We determine the number of significant cointegrating 
vectors given by the cointegration rank, and the short- and the long-run parameters, α  
and β. Next we conduct hypotheses tests on the short- and the long-run parameters. The 
different tests conducted are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2  
Summary of research hypotheses 
Long-run reactions to permanent price changes  
H0: Prices are in long-run equilibrium Rank of Π = 0 < r < n 
H0: Brands or stores are not all competing at the same price tiers H0: βi = βj  
Short-run reactions to permanent price changes  
H0: Prices will take over one week to return to equilibrium H0: 0  < αi < 1 
H0: A brand or store does not respond to a competitive price 
change 
H0: αi ≠ 0 
H0: Short-run price adjustments are not symmetric H0: αi ≠ αj 
H0: Prices are exogenous H0: αi1 = ... = αin = 0 
Price leadership  
H0: A store or brand is a price leader H0: γi = αi = 0 
 
D. Results of Long-Run Analysis 
The results of the multivariate analysis using the Johansen method (Johansen, 1988; 
Johansen and  Juselius, 1990) are provided in Table 3. First, we determine the number of 
significant cointegrating vectors (the rank of the n matrix). Table 3, reports the Log- 
likelihood ratio test scores. The Likelihood ratio test or trace statistic is given as: 
 
Qr T ∑ log(1 λi )ki= r +                                         (6) 
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where, r=0, l ,..., k-1 is the number of significant eigen vectors, λ i  is the i-th largest 
eigenvalue of the matrix π, Qr is the trace statistic and is the test of H1(r) against H1(k). 
The number of cointegrating relations r, is determined by sequentially testing this 
hypothesis from r=0 to r=k-1 until we fail to reject. The critical values are provided in 
Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
 
Table 3  
Results of cointegration analysis showing number of significant cointegrating 
vectors (indicated by the likelihood ratio test) 
Number of  cointegrating vectors 1 2 3 4 5 
Beer 
Likelihood Ratio 76.2** 48.9** 21.1 * 11.74* 1.4 
Number of  cointegrating vectors  1 2 3   
Toilet Tissue 
Likelihood ratio 57.8** 32.2** 0.026   
** is statistically significant at 0.05; * is statistically significant at 0.10. 
 
 
For the tissue data we find two significant cointegrating vectors, while for the 
beer two vectors are significant at the 0.05 level and two at the 0.10 level of 
significance. This raises the question whether to include two or four cointegrating 
vectors for the beer data. Due to the large number of parameters to be estimated these 
tests tend to have low statistical power, which may lead to failure to reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, we plot the cointegrating vectors over time and check the 
stationarity of the cointegrating vectors. Since the cointegrating vector consists of 
stable linear long-run relationship, this vector should be constant over time. A visual 
inspection shows that for the tissue data only the first two vectors are stationary, 
indicating that two cointegrating vectors govern the stable long-run trend between the 
three price series. For the beer data the first three vectors are stationary while the forth 
vector is almost stationary. Therefore, we will use the results with four cointegrating 
vectors.3  
These results indicate that prices for tissue and beer are in long-run equilibrium.  
The next question pertains to the long-run relationship between prices. For example, 
certain brands may play a greater role in the preservation of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship. Specifica1ly, a brand may be more responsive to long-run price changes by 
certain competing brands than to other brands. Therefore, we look at the magnitude of 
the long-run relationships and test for the equality of long-run coefficients. Table 4 
provides the results of long-run coefficients for pair-wise tests for the different price 
series. Though the results in Table 4 are based on bivariate cointegration analyses, all 
hypotheses tests were conducted using the multivariate model. For example, the long-
run relationship between the prices of brand 1 and brand 2 of beer is, Price 1 = 1.39* 
Price 2. Next, we test for the existence of a one-to-one relationship between the long-
run prices. The hypothesis of the equality of the long-run parameters, Ho: βi = βj, is tested 
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using the Log likelihood Ratio Test. This test statistic has a Χ2 distribution with r x 
(n-m) degrees of freedom, where r is the rank of the matrix with error-correction terms 
(Π), n is the dimension of Π, n-m is the number of restriction, 휆∗̂  and 휆̂ are the 
estimates of the eigenvalues of the restricted and unrestricted model. These results show 
that for the beer data, Budweiser and Miller, and Busch and Old Milwaukee have a 
long-run one- to-one relationship. These results suggest that Budweiser and Miller are 
competing at the same price- tier while Busch and Old Milwaukee are competing at a 
lower price-tier. For the tissue data, Soft & Gentle and Northern are the closest 
competitors based on price, but this relationship is not as strong. It is important to note 
that though not all brands are competing at the same price tier, long-run prices tend to 
be in equilibrium. 
 
Table 4  
Results of long-run relationships between pair-wise prices using cointegration analysis 
Beer prices Long-run Equilibrium Ho:  βi     =  βj a 
1 &2 Yes    1.39** 
1 &3 Yes    1.09 
 1 &4 No         -- 
1 &5 Yes    1.42** 
2 &3 Yes    0.78** 
2 &4 No         -- 
2 &5 Yes    1.02 
3 &4 No        -- 
3 &5 Yes    1.31** 
4& 5 No        -- 
Tissue prices Long-run Equilibrium Ho: βi  = βj 
1 &2 Yes 0.87** 
1 &3 Yes 0.78** 
2 &3 Yes 0.89** 
a βj   parameter from cointegration analysis (βj  is normalized to 1). ** indicates that βi    is statistically 
significantly different fromβj  at the 95% level of confidence, based on a Chi-square test. 
 
 
E. Results of the Short-nm Analysis 
Having obtained the cointegrating vectors (and after including the restrictions), we obtain 
the VECM involving price of tissue as shown below: 
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ΔP1,t = - 0.438 ΔP1,t-1 - 0.323 ΔP1,t-2 - 0.218 ΔP1,t-3  - 0.048 ΔP2,t-1  - 0.068 ΔP2,t-2 - 0.028 ΔP2,t-3 
            (-6.54)            (-5.10)            (-4.16)             (-0.77)            (-1.19)          (-0.62)  
 
            - 0.062 ΔP3,t-1 - 0.044 ΔP3,t-2 - 0.001 ΔP3,t-3  - 0.007 (P1,t-k  - 3.770 P2,t-k  + 2.588 P3,t-k)  
            (-1.36)            (-1.08)            (-0.01)             (-0.47)             
 
            + 0.118 (-2.286 P1,t-k  + P2,t-k  + 0.889 P3,t-k) + ε1,t 
              (4.52) 
 
ΔP2,t = - 0.153 ΔP1,t-1 - 0.099 ΔP1,t-2 - 0.002 ΔP1,t-3  - 0.352 ΔP2,t-1  - 0.211 ΔP2,t-2 - 0.104 ΔP2,t-3 
            (-1.87)            (-1.29)            (-0.32)              (-4.60)            (-3.03)            (-1.88)  
 
            - 0.217 ΔP3,t-1 - 0.107 ΔP3,t-2 - 0.042 ΔP3,t-3  + 0.093 (P1,t-k  - 3.770 P2,t-k  + 2.588 P3,t-k)  
            (-3.91)            (-2.14)             (-1.03)              (5.10)             
 
            - 0.044 (-2.286 P1,t-k  + P2,t-k  + 0.889 P3,t-k) + ε1,t 
            (-1.40) 
 
ΔP3,t = - 0.438 ΔP1,t-1 - 0.109 ΔP1,t-2 - 0.233 ΔP1,t-3  - 0.265 ΔP2,t-1  - 0.167 ΔP2,t-2 - 0.024 ΔP2,t-3 
            (-0.50)            (-1.10)            (-2.83)             (-2.70)            (-1.87)            (-0.35)  
 
            - 0.357 ΔP3,t-1 - 0.292 ΔP3,t-2 - 0.147 ΔP3,t-3  - 0.133 (P1,t-k  - 3.770 P2,t-k  + 2.588 P3,t-k)  
            (-5.03)            (-4.54)             (-2.84)             (-5.66)             
 
            - 0.111 (-2.286 P1,t-k  + P2,t-k  + 0.889 P3,t-k) + ε1,t                                                                                               (7) 
            (-2.71) 
 
where, l=Soft & Gentle, 2=Northern, and 3=Charmin; t-values are given in 
parentheses. 
In the above equation, there are three lagged price terms and two significant 
cointegrating vectors (as the rank of Π = 2, see Table 3) and we estimate six α and β
parameters. The t-values are given in parentheses. The two cointegrating vectors 
constitute two long-run equilibrium relationships between the three price series. The 
results show that for all brands the changes in prices are negatively influenced by its 
own lagged price changes. These results are indicative of frequent price changes, where 
temporary price cuts are followed by increases to the regular price level. Changes in 
price for Soft & Gentle are influenced by the brand’ s own lagged prices but not by 
competitors’  prices. Northern’s price is influenced by lagged changes in the price of 
Charmin, while Charmin’ s price changes are influenced by lagged changes in the 
price of Northern. The negative influence of lagged competitive prices indicates that 
retailers tend to alternate the price cuts of the different brands. The results for the beer 
analysis are reported in Table 5. One difference with the results for the tissue data is that 
not all prices are influenced by own lagged prices. Budweiser’s short-run prices are 
mostly influenced by Milwaukee’s Best and Old Milwaukee. In general most brands’  
short-run prices are influenced by Old Milwaukee’s  prices, which is the most frequently 
promoted brand. Furthermore, prices are negatively influenced by lagged competitive 
prices indicating that there is a lagged response to competitive price specials. 
The short-run α parameters estimate the speed of adjustment, which is the time 
it takes for prices to move back to the long-run equilibrium relationship (e.g. after a price 
special). For example, α11 = -0.007 reflects the speed of adjustment of the price of Soft 
and Gentle to its long-run equilibrium relationship with the prices of Northern and 
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Charmin. These results are used to test the hypotheses about the short-run pricing 
behavior, as indicated in Table 2. In the short run, prices are frequently in 
disequilibrium due to frequent price specials. The first question we address is how 
long does it take for prices to return to an equilibrium state? Therefore, the first 
hypothesis we look at is Ho: αi = 0. For tissue, four of the six α parameters are 
statistically significant (see equation 7), while 11 out of 20 for the beer data (see Table 
5). In the first price equation for tissue, α11 = 0, and α12 ≠ 0, hence only the second 
long-run equilibrium relationship has an effect on the price of Soft & Gentle. In all of 
the instances (for tissue and beer) we reject Ho: α11 = … α1n = 0, indicating that none of 
the prices are exogenous and all prices change to return to the equilibrium relationship. 
However, the degree of adjustment differs, depending on the magnitude of the beta 
parameter. 
None of the α parameterswere greater than one while most were significantly
less than one suggesting that it will take more than one week for prices to return to 
equilibrium. The error-correction terms for tissue were smaller than for the beer 
data indicating a slower adjustment towards long-run equilibrium for tissue. In 
general, these results indicate that there is lagged response in competitive reactions. 
Finally, we tested for the equality of the α parameters, studying whether the speed of 
adjustment is symmetric (Ho: αi = αj). We could not reject the equality of the short-run 
parameters in most cases. This implies that the time it takes for prices to move back 
to the long-run equilibrium relationship e.g. after a price change is the same for most 
competitors. 
 
F. Price Leadership 
 
We use the Granger Causality test to study price leadership. The Granger Causality test 
is an F-test that determines whether lagged prices of brand 2 have an influence on the 
price of brand l in the presence of lagged prices for brand l. If lagged prices are 
significant, then the price of brand 2 Granger-causes price of brand 1. Given that 
prices are non-stationary, a problem with the Granger Causality test is that it requires 
differencing of nonstationary data. This leads to a loss of any information about long-
run causality. To overcome this problem, we use the vector error-correction model to 
test for causality, enabling us to distinguish between short- and long-run Granger 
causality. More specifically, we test for the significance of short-run Granger-causality 
(Ho: γi = 0), and for long-run Granger-causality (Ho: αi = 0). Note when two variables 
are cointegrated, at least one must Granger-cause the other (Granger 1986), however, 
this does not ensure price leadership as Granger causality can also be multidirectional. 
The results of these tests are given in Table 6. Results show that in the short 
run, price of Soft & Gentle Granger-causes price of Charmin. However, price of 
Charmin does not influence price of Soft & Gentle. Therefore, Soft & Gentle is a 
price leader with respect to Charmin (but not to Northern). Yet, Northern and 
Charmin simultaneously influence each other's prices. These results tend to indicate 
that brands that compete in the long run do not necessarily compete in the short run. 
For example, the price of Soft & Gentle is influenced by the long-run prices of 
Northern and Charmin but not by their short-run price levels. For the beer data most 
of the short-run Granger-causality tests are insignificant. Old Milwaukee 'short-run' 
Granger-causes prices of Budweiser, Miller and Milwuakee’s Best. 
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Table 5  
Results of VECM model for beer data 
 Price la Price 2 Price 3 Price 4 Price 5 
Price 1(-1) .043 (.066) 
-.177**  
(.051) 
.093 
(.063) 
-.020 
(.045) 
-.077 
(.063) 
Price 1 (-2) -.053 (.056) 
-.099**  
(.043) 
.012 
(.053) 
-.053 
(.038) 
-.015 
(.053) 
Price 2 (-1) -.069 (.077) 
-.189** 
(.059) 
-.068 
(.073) 
-.059 
(.053) 
-.014 
(.073) 
Price 2 (-2) -.001 (.086) 
-.147** 
(.053) 
.064 
(.065) 
.007 
(.047) 
.113 
(.066) 
Price 3 (-1) -.050 (.066) 
.001 
(.051) 
-.219** 
(.063) 
-.032 
(.046) 
-.047 
<.063) 
Price 3 (-2) .034 (.058) 
-.021 
(.045) 
-.046 
(.056) 
-.056 
<.040) 
.017 
(.056) 
Price 4 (-1) -.275**  (.094) 
.065 
(.072) 
-.069 
(.090) 
-.155**  
(.065) 
-.315** 
(.090) 
Price 4 (-2) -.261** (.078) 
-.076 
(.060} 
.063 
(.074) 
-.112**  
(.054) 
-.125 
(.075) 
Price 5 (-1) -.201** (.075) 
-.072 
(.058) 
-.178**  
(.072) 
-.133**  
(.052) 
.095 
(.071) 
Price 5 (-2) -.159**  (.054) 
-.038 
(.042) 
-.111** 
(.052) 
-.1 1 1** 
(.037) 
.079 
(.052) 
Coint Vector 1 -.600**  (.007) 
.132**  
(.055) 
.050 
(.069) 
.081 
(1.64) 
.260**  
(.069) 
Coint Vector 2 .001 (.007) 
-.321** 
(.052) 
.082 
(.064) 
.129** 
(.047) 
.058 
(.065) 
Coint Vector 3 .168**  (.057) 
.048 
(.044) 
-.281 ** 
(.054) 
.012  
l.304) 
.107** 
(.005) 
Coint Vector 4 .454**  (.102) 
-.031 
(.397) 
.010 
(.108) 
-.511** 
<.070) 
.546 
(.097) 
 a Price1=priceof Budweiser, 2=Busch, 3=Miller, 4=Milwaukee’sBest, 5=Old Milwaukee; ** is statistically 
significant at 0.05; * is statistically significant at 0.10. 
 
Table 6 
Results of price-leadership analysis for beer and tissue data 
Beera Short-runb Combinedc Beer Short-runb Combinedc 
Price 1  2 7.15**  49.31*** Price 3 4   2.01   58.26*** 
Price 1  3 2.73  43.27*** Price 3 5   1.15 235.71*** 
Price 1 4 2.14  58.75*** Price 4 1 13.02**   72.24*** 
Price 1 5 1.75 231.45*** Price 4   2   5.53   47.92*** 
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Price 2 1 0.97  72.97*** Price 4 3   3.06   39.76*** 
Price 2 3 3.47  39.16*** Price 4 5 12.71** 123.67*** 
Price 2 4 1.87  60.55*** Price 5 1   9.74**   74.37*** 
Price 2  5 4.36 232.84*** Price 5 2   1.61   47.85*** 
Price 3  1 1.75  71.23*** Price 5 3   6.83**   38.09*** 
Price 3  2 0.44  48.44*** Price 5 4   9.75**   59.46*** 
Tissuea Short-runb Combinedc Tissue Short-runb Combinedc 
Price 1  2 4.13  24.87*** Price 3  1   2.63   39.39*** 
Price 2  1 3.47  36.75*** Price 2  3   8.69**   31.15*** 
Price 1  3 7.65**  37.48*** Price 3  2 16.64***   26.40*** 
a Price beer: 1=price of Budweiser, 2=Busch, 3=Miller, 4=Milwaukee’s Best, 5=Old Milwaukee 
a Price toilet tissue: 1=price of Soft & Gentle, 2=Northem, 3=Charmin 
b Value of F-test for hypothesis  γi = 0  
c Value of F-test for hypothesis αi = 0 
*** is statistically significant at 0.01; ** is statistically significant at 0.05. 
 
G. Impulse Response Function 
 
Finally, to determine competitive reactions to temporary (unexpected) price changes 
we estimate the impulse response functions and the variance decomposition. The 
impulse response functions show the effect over time on price due to a significant 
shock in the system (for example, the effect of a significant price change or an 
unexpected event), as well as, the competitive response to this price shock. Consider 
the VECM in equation (5). A change in u1t will immediately change the value of current price P1. It will also change all future values of P1 ... Pn since lagged P, appears 
in all the equations. Thus a perturbation in one innovation in the VECM sets up a chain 
reaction over time in all the variables in the VAR. Impulse response functions 
calculate these chain reactions. Impulse response functions trace the effects of a 
shock to an endogenous variable on the variables in the VECM. By contrast, variance 
decomposition decomposes variation in an endogenous variable into component 
shocks to the endogenous variables in the VECM. The variance decomposition gives 
information about the relative importance of each random innovation to the variables 
in the VAR (for a discussion of these concepts see Hamilton, 1994). 
The impulse response functions for the tissue data are plotted in Figure 2. The first 
graph displays the impact of a one standard deviation shock in the price of Soft & 
Gentle over time, and graphs 2 and 3 for Northern and Charmin. All graphs for beer 
display a similar trend as for the tissue data. There is a rapid decline after a price shock 
indicating little longer-lasting effect. In all instances we observe competitive responses 
which are quite similar. One interesting finding is that a short-run price change leads to 
a long-run shift in prices. These results imply that the usage of temporary price specials 
will lead to price wars and decreased prices. 
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Figure 2 
Impulse response function for toilet tissue 
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Finally, we conduct a variance decomposition analysis shown in Table 7. The 
numbers in Table 7 are the variance explained in price due to a price shock. 75.7% of 
the variance in the price shock of Soft & Gentle after 10 weeks is explained by its own 
innovations, 14.2% by Northern and 10.1% by Charmin. Results are fairly similar for the 
different brands. Yet, one noticeable difference is that a significantly larger degree of 
variance due to a price shock to Charmin is explained by Northern rather than Soft & 
Gentle. For the beer data, we observe some differences across brands. In particular, 
Milwaukee’s Best's price variance is mostly due to its own innovations, while Miller's 
price variance is to a larger extent due to competition. Also we observe asymmetry; 
the price of Budweiser is mostly influenced by the price of Miller. In general, we can 
conclude that Budweiser's price is relatively the most exogenous; its relative variance 
is mostly explained by its own innovations. 
 
Table 7  
Percentage of variance explained due to a change in price for beer and tissue 
Beer 
price shock to: Budweiser Busch Miller 
Milwaukee’s 
Best 
Old 
Milwaukee 
Budweiser 70.3a   4.1 13.7   8.9   3.0 
Busch  6.9 79.3   7.1   3.9   2.7 
Miller  6.2 12.0 67.3   8.8   5.7 
Milwaukee’s Best  1.4   4.9   6.3 85.8   1.5 
Old Milwaukee  2.2   2.4   9.8   5.1 80.6 
Tissue 
price shock to: 
Soft & 
Gentle Northern Charmin   
Soft & Gentle 75.7 14.2 10.1   
Northern   9.0 77.5 13.5   
Charmin   4.3 19.3 76.3   
a Percentage of variance explained due to a change in price (for tissue after 10 weeks) 
 
 
IV.        CONCLUSION 
 
Once stores are located, retailers have limited control over location as a means of retail 
competition. Retail dynamics and the competitive structure of the retail market under 
such circumstances typically depend on other strategy dimensions, pricing being the 
most important. To optimize their market share, retailers use both short-term and 
long-term pricing strategies. Short- term strategies reflect immediate responses to 
competitor's pricing decisions for specific products or brands while long-term 
strategies concern the positioning of the store in terms of prices. For regional science, 
this means that the analysis of the competitive structure and dynamics of any retail 
system necessarily requires an integrated analysis of the short- and long-term retail 
pricing strategies. The present paper offers an analysis, using cointegration analysis. 
Our study makes contributions to the literature on competitive response. We use 
cointegration analysis of the prices of different brands within a store chain over time and 
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of prices of a single brand across store chains through time, in a study of the dynamics 
of competitive response. In contrast to previous research, we studied retailer competitive 
response by conducting our analysis at the store-chain level. Furthermore, most previous 
research has only studied short-run competitive responses (Leeflang and Wittink, 1992, 
1996). Overall, results indicate that an important distinction must be made between the 
short- and long-run response to temporary and permanent changes in competitive prices.  
We summarize our key findings as follows: 
 
A. Long-run Price Competition: 
 Most long-run price time-series are non-stationary (invalidating the usage of 
OLS estimation). 
 Most prices are in long-run equilibrium, indicating that prices move together in 
the long run. 
 All prices and relative prices were in long-run equilibrium for the stationary 
tissue market, but not so for the non-stationary beer market. 
 We identify different price-tiers, where brands are competing more closely based on 
price. Though brands compete at different price-tiers, prices are in long-run 
equilibrium. 
 
B. Short-run Price Competition: 
 The short-run parameters (α's) are symmetric for most competing brands, 
indicating that the time it takes to return to the price equilibrium after a price 
change is symmetric. 
 Our results show that changes in prices are negatively affected by a brand’s own 
lagged price changes, a result that is consistent with reactions to frequent price 
specials, where we observe an increase in sales followed by dip in sales after a 
price special. 
 Half of the brands and store chains do not react to a price change in the short-run 
(e.g. do not match price specials). 
 When a competitor reacts to a price change, on average it takes more than one 
week for prices to return to equilibrium (α < 1). 
 Competitors influence retailer pricing strategies; yet, responses tend to occur 
with a lag. None of the store chains or brands in this market is a price leader. 
 Within in a store chain retailers tend to alternate promotions for different brands. 
Our paper has important implications for managers. The results show which 
brands compete on price both in the short and long run. These competitive dynamics 
may be quite complex. For example, two brands competing based upon price in the 
long run may respond to competitive promotions from brands at different price tiers 
in the short-run. Our model can be used as a tool for retailers trying to anticipate 
competitive responses to a price change or anticipating price changes by competitors. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1. The aim of the ADF tests is to use the lagged changes in the dependent variable to 
capture the auto- correlated omitted variable which would otherwise appear in the 
error term (see Banerjee et al., 1993). A critical issue in the ADF test is the choice 
of the number of lags. The suggested strategy is to select the largest number of lags 
for which y is significant in Equation (5) (see Doomik and Hendry, 1996). 
2. We included an intercept, an adjustment for seasonality, and dummy variables 
to adjust for outliers. The number of lags was set at 20, to ensure that residuals 
are well-behaved (it is better to set the number of lags too high, which leads to 
some loss in efficiency, than too low as remaining autocorrelation in the 
residuals will invalidate the tests). Non-stationarity tests were also conducted 
using different lag structures and results were similar. 
3. We also estimated the results using the three cointegrating vectors and results 
were similar to the four-vector solution. 
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